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INTRODUCTION
The United Nations International Law Commission ("ILC"), an
organization leading the effort to codify principles of international
law,' plays an important role in the creation of a legal framework
governing international groundwater resources.2 The need for the
protection and sustainable exploitation of groundwater reserves is
more pressing in light of population growth, the impacts of climate

1. See generally Statute of the International Law Commission, G.A. Res.
174(11), U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., 123d mtg., U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 21, 1947)
[hereinafter ILC Statute] (establishing an International Law Commission
consisting of thirty-four individuals with international legal expertise elected by
the General Assembly to fulfill the obligations in the U.N. Charter to develop and
codify international law).
2. See Gabriel Eckstein, A Hydrogeological Perspective of the Status of
Ground Water Resources Under the UN Watercourse Convention, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 525, 533-39 (2005) (surrmnarizing the International Law Commission's
work, from its 1974 attempt to formulate a new agreement on water resources to its
renewal of work in the 1980s, as well as the production of draft laws in the 1990s
which culminated in the 1997 Watercourse Convention).
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change, and resource scarcity.' This Note will analyze the most
recent iteration in the development of international groundwater law:
the draft articles on the Law on Transboundary Aquifers ("Aquifer
Law").4 It will also address the Convention on the Law of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses ("Watercourse
Convention"),' focusing on the use of terms and affirmative
obligations placed upon states in both instruments.6 The failure to
ratify the Watercourse Convention fourteen years after its adoption
makes the Aquifer Law the next-and perhaps last--opportunity to
establish binding guidelines for the exploitation of this vital
resource.' However, in order to improve the Aquifer Law's chances
for ratification, the ILC should revise the current draft articles to
improve clarity and afford states as much flexibility as possible to
form bilateral and multilateral agreements governing their shared
groundwater resources. To accomplish this, the ILC should look to
existing practice with oil and natural gas extraction in drafting its
new language.' It should also seize the opportunity to establish an
3. See, e.g., Nigel W. Arnell, Climate Change and Global Water Resources:
SRES Emissions and Socio-Economic Scenarios, 14 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 31,
31 (2004) (finding that stresses on water resources are increased by climate
change); cf Charles J. Vbr6smarty et al., Global Water Resources. Vulnerability
from Climate Change and Population Growth, 289 SCIENCE 284, 284 (2000)
(concluding that increasing demand for water is more pressing than the problems
of greenhouse warming).
4. See generally The Law of Transboundary Aquifers, G.A. Res. 63/124,
pmbl., U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/124/Annex (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter Aquifer Law].
5. See generally The Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
Doc.
Annex, U.N.
Res. 51/299,
International Watercourses, G.A.
A[Res/51/299/Annex (May 21, 1997) [hereinafter Watercourse Convention]
(establishing binding obligations and guidelines for states regarding the use of
rivers, lakes, and other types of surface water, as well as groundwater relating to
them).
6. Compare Aquifer Law, supra note 4, arts. 4, 6-8 (imposing obligations on
States to use transboundary aquifers responsibly and equitably, prevent significant
harm, cooperate, and regularly exchange data and information), with Watercourse
Convention, supra note 5, arts. 5, 7-9 (creating similar obligations with respect to
international watercourses).
7. See Salman M.A. Salman, The United Nations Watercourses Convention
Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into ForceProven Difficult?, 32 WATER INT'L
1, 8-9 (2007) (lamenting the reluctance of U.N. member states to ratify the
Watercourse Convention due to their views that the obligations imposed by the
Watercourse Convention unfairly advantage either upstream or downstream
riparian states).
8. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The International Law Commission Adopts
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explicit human right to water and use this right as the basis for any
obligations or restrictions on state action pertaining to transboundary
groundwater resources.'
Part II of this Note examines the ongoing effort to codify
international legal norms and the development of international law
concerning groundwater.10 It also reviews current practices with
transboundary petroleum and natural gas deposits, as well as the
present legal basis for the implied human right to water." Part III
argues that the Aquifer Law is necessary but unlikely to be ratified in
its current form, providing a critical analysis of Aquifer Law and
detailing its confusing overlap with-and damaging similarities tothe Watercourse Convention. 12 Part IV recommends that the ILC
seize the opportunity to establish an explicit human right to water
and to draft a treaty governing transboundary freshwater which will
actually be ratified by the U.N. member states. It suggests the ILC
may accomplish this by amending the language in the Aquifer Law
to distinguish it from the Watercourse Convention and to include an
explicit human right to water,13 as well as by making most of the
provisions non-binding, allowing states the same flexibility they
Draft Articles on Transboundary Aquifers, 103 AM. J. INT'L L. 272, 274 (2009)
(citing ILC Special Rapporteur Chusei Yamada's observation of the similarity
between the legal frameworks governing both transboundary groundwater and oil
and natural gas).
9. Cf HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS: TEXT AND MATERIALS 185-87 (3d ed.

2008) (commenting on the duties imposed on states by human rights obligations
and noting that the development of rights over time expands state responsibilities
even when they are not explicitly required).
10. See discussion infra Part II (chronicling the work of the ILC and other
international organizations throughout the twentieth century which played a role in
the progressive development of international groundwater law).
11. See discussion infra Part II (characterizing current state and international
practices for the extraction of transboundary petroleum and natural gas deposits as
flexible due to the non-binding nature of the customary norms upon which the
practices are based).
12. See discussion infra Part III (arguing that the current draft of the Aquifer
Law is unlikely to be adopted as a Convention due to similarities with the
Watercourse Convention and failure to distinguish its subject-matter, but that it is
important to adopt the Aquifer Law as a Convention).
13. See discussion infra Part IV.A (recommending that the Aquifer Law refer
to the Watercourse Convention to clarify which laws will apply to which types of
groundwater, and by justifying any affirmative obligations pertaining to shared
groundwater on an explicit human right to water).
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II. BACKGROUND
Underground aquifers represent a significant proportion of
potentially available fresh water in the world.'I A large amount of the
world's population depends on groundwater for their basic needs,"
and at least 273 aquifers span an international boundary.17 This
reality helps drive the ongoing effort to provide guidelines for the
exploitation and preservation of groundwater resources, which is part
of a greater endeavor to define legal norms and obligations for the
utilization of transboundary resources.'"
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING
GROUNDWATER

Before the ILC existed, international law was created either
through the drafting and enactment of treaties or through custom. 19
14. See discussion infra Part IV.B (suggesting that most of the articles of the
Aquifer Law be framed as guidelines which states should follow, rather than
affirmative obligations that they must adhere to, based on successful state practice
organizing bilateral and multilateral agreements governing the extraction and
utilization of transboundary oil and natural gas deposits).
15. See Stephen Foster, Essential Concepts for Groundwater Regulators, in
GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF A WORLD

BANK SEMINAR 15, 15 (Salman M.A. Salman ed., 1999) (stating that of the

estimated thirty-seven million cubic kilometers of freshwater present on the planet,
twenty-two percent is located below the Earth's surface, which represents ninetyseven percent of freshwater not already contained in the polar ice caps).
16. See Gabriel Eckstein & Yoram Eckstein, A HydrogeologicalApproach to
Transboundary Ground Water Resources and InternationalLaw, 19 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 201, 201-02 (2003) (citing statistics that in parts of Europe and the United
States dependence on groundwater to supply drinking water exceeds 90 percent).
17. See Catherine Brahic, A Law to Stop the Wells From Running Dry?, NEW
SCIENTIST, Nov. 8, 2008, at 8 (emphasizing the importance of the Aquifer Law in
helping to resolve anticipated critical water shortages given the abundance of
trans-border aquifers).
18. See G.A. Res. 57/21, f 2, 7, U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/21 (Jan. 21, 2003)
(illustrating the U.N. General Assembly's approval of the ILC's decision to
continue its work on a number of topics, including shared natural resources, which
will be added to the Commission's work programme).
19. See JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE

UNITED NATIONS 1-2 (2000) (critically assessing these two methods of creating
international law with emphasis on the potential for confusing and contradictory
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the twentieth century, custom ceased to function as the primary
method of establishing international law. 20 Instead, customary laws
are now used as precedent by international courts and by
organizations seeking to codify international norms through treaties
and other agreements.2 1 Shortly after its establishment in 1947, the
ILC undertook fourteen initial topics, and then added topics referred
from the General Assembly. 22 Over the years the Commission has
produced a number of important international codes, including the
Law of Treaties, the Law of the Sea, and draft articles on
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Properties.2 3
Currently, the ILC consists of thirty-four members, each from a
different country pursuant to the requirements of its statute.2 4 The
ILC reports to the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, which
addresses legal issues and questions for the General Assembly.25
Article 16 of the ILC specifies the procedure for the ILC's
consideration of a topic, allowing for appointment of a rapporteur
responsible for the topic and numerous consultations on drafts before
the final draft is proposed.26 Among the ILC's most recent projects
norms).
20. Contra Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to
Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 757, 757
(2001) (differentiating between traditional and modem uses of custom as a source
of international law in order to describe the current resurgence of the importance of
custom).
2 1. Id.
22. See Clyde Eagleton, FirstSession of the InternationalLaw Commission, 43
AM. J. INT'L L. 758, 760 (1949) (listing the selection of the first topics for
consideration by the ILC which were the Law of Treaties, Arbitral Procedure, and
the Regime of the High Seas).
23. See MORTON, supra note 19, at 15-18 (chronicling the history of the ILC in
a decade-by-decade analysis to demonstrate both the progress and difficulties the
ILC has faced in codifying international law).
24. See
Membership, UNITED
NATIONS
INT'L
LAW
COMM'N,
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited May 18, 2011) (listing each of the thirtyfour members and their nationalities and providing the relevant text from Article 2
regarding its establishing statute governing membership); see also MORTON, supra
note 19, at 9 (charting the growth and increasing diversity of the ILC composition
from fifteen to thirty-four, including the addition of nine Third World
representatives from Africa, Latin America and Asia not included in the initial
grouping).
25. Cf Membership, supra note 24 (describing the Sixth Committee as the
primary forum for consideration of allocating ILC seats to U.N. Member States).
26. See ILC Statute, supra note 1, art. 16 (outlining a process starting with the
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were the draft articles on the Watercourse Convention.27
The first organization to approach the issue of international
groundwaters was not the ILC, but rather the International Law
Association ("ILA").28 Unlike the ILC, which was established by the
United Nations, the ILA was founded by a group of scholars in the
19th century to codify the law of nations. 29 The ILA promulgated the
Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers
("Helsinki Rules") in 1966.0 The Helsinki Rules defined drainage
basins as "including [both] surface and underground waters, flowing
into a common terminus."" In 1986, the ILA released a new set of
rules called the Seoul Rules, expanding the definition in the Helsinki
Rules by including aquifers that relate to surface waters, as well as
aquifers which do not.3 2

formulation of a work plan, followed by numerous stages of consultations with
governments and experts, and concluding with the proposal of a draft to the
General Assembly through the Secretary General).
27. See MORTON, supra note 19, at 18 (including the Watercourse Convention
in a list of new topics added during the ILC's fifth decade of work, which the
author describes as consisting of substantially less developed and codified areas of
law than in previous years).
28. See Charles B. Bourne, The InternationalLaw Association's Contribution
to InternationalWater Resources Law, in SLAVKO BOGDANOVIc, INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF WATER RESOURCES: CONTRIBUTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW

ASSOCIATION (1954-2000) 3-5 (2001) (charting the beginning of the ILA's work
on international fresh water resources to 1954 when it was prompted by a series of

international river disputes).
29. See BOGDANOVIC, supra note 28, at xxvii (chronicling the origins of the
ILA which was established as the Association for the Reform and Codification of
the Law of Nations in Brussels in 1873).
30. THE HELSINKI RULES ON THE USES OF THE WATERS OF INTERNATIONAL
RIVERS (1966), reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 125 (Claudia Tofan & Simona Strambu eds., 2008) [hereinafter
HELSINKI RULES].
31. HELSINKI RULES, supra note 30, art. 2; see SALMAN M.A. SALMAN, THE
WORLD BANK POLICY FOR PROJECTS ON INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS: AN
HISTORICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 54, 56 (2009) (describing the Helsinki Rules as
a grouping of principles and resolutions relating to international freshwater
resources, including the developing concepts of "reasonable and equitable
utilization").
32. See THE SEOUL RULES ON INTERNATIONAL GROUNDWATERS (1966),
reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 123
[hereinafter SEOUL RULES] (requiring through Article 1 that aquifers not connected

to surface waters intersect the boundary of two or more states in order to fall
within the scope of the rules).
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In 1994, the ILC completed its review of the draft Watercourse
Convention and presented a set of draft articles to the U.N. General
Assembly.33 After the promulgation of the Watercourse Convention,
the ILC reexamined the types of groundwater included under the
Convention's provisions and submitted its draft articles on the
Aquifer Law to the U.N. General Assembly in August 2008.34 The
General Assembly passed a resolution commending the ILC's work
and included the Aquifer Law draft for further discussion in the
agenda of its Sixty-Sixth Session in 2011.35
B. THE CURRENT LEGAL BASIS FOR THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
AND EXISTING PRACTICE CONCERNING SHARED GROUNDWATER
RESOURCES

The "right to water" is a basic human right most often applied in
the context of meeting people's water consumption needs for
survival.36 No explicit legal authority creates this right; however, a
number of treaties and agreements refer to the goal of meeting basic
water needs in the context of other guaranteed rights.37 For instance,
some states recognize the right to water as an aspect of the right to
33. See Stephen McCaffrey, International Groundwater Law: Evolution and
Context, in GROUNDWATER: LEGAL AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES: PROCEEDINGS OF
A WORLD BANK SEMINAR 139, 155 (Salman M.A. Salman, ed., 1999) (relating the
history of the final enactment of the Watercourse Convention, which was prepared
by the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly and passed in 1997).
34. See Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 60th sess., May 5-June 6, July 7-Aug.
8, 2008,
46-49, U.N. Doc. A/63/10; GAOR, 63d Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2008)
(adopting the draft articles and recommending that U.N. member states approve
them and consider forming bilateral and multilateral treaties around them, in
addition to urging the General Assembly to adopt a Convention on the subject); see
also Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 2 (failing to define groundwater and instead
including a definition of aquifer as "a permeable water bearing geological
formation underlain by a less permeable layer and the water contained in the
saturated zone of the formation").
35. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, pmbl. (recommending that the member
states and General Assembly take the articles under further consideration before
working towards any potential Convention based upon their provisions).
36. See 2 INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 111 (Claudia
Tofan & Simona Strambu eds., 2008) (prioritizing the use of water for drinking,
cooking, and other life-sustaining needs when determining what activities will be
covered by a codified right to water).
37. See id (citing the 1977 Mar del Plata Statement, the 1986 U.N. Right to
Development, and the 1992 Earth Summit as examples of instruments referring to
the need to include a right to water in providing for "basic needs").
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food.38 Based on this state practice, it is widely viewed that a human
right to water is recognized by Article 11 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR").39 in
addition, several state policies guaranteeing the right to basic human
needs include the right to water.40 Indeed, some states have already
incorporated the human right to water into their constitutions.4 1
Others deal with aquifers by legislation, such as Brazil's National
Water Resource Policy, which retains government control over
certain water rights.4 2
The human right to water is fundamentally different from a "water
right," which is a "legal right to abstract and use a quantity of water
from a. .. river, stream or aquifer." 43 For example, a water right may
grant the holder permission to store a quantity of water prior to use.44
However, while water rights grant certain privileges, they can also
place certain restrictions and obligations on the holder of the right.45
38. Cf Amy Hardberger, Whose Job is it Anyway?: Governmental Obligations
Created by the Human Right to Water, 41 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 533, 539 (2006) (noting
the role of Comment 15 on the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights in establishing a right to water and the choice by several
governments to include this right among their state policies).
39. Cf International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 11,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (recognizing the right to an adequate standard of
living, which includes "adequate food, clothing and housing," as well as the
"continuous improvement of living conditions").
40. See Hardberger, supra note 38, at 539-40 (noting that South Africa, for
example, includes the human right to water as a right afforded to all its citizens,
and acknowledging that both state legislation and U.N. documents have increased
recognition that establishing a right to water is a necessity).
41. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST., 1996, art. 27 (establishing the human right to
water as part of South Africa's Bill of Rights).
42. See generally Decreto No. 9.433, de 8 de Janeiro de 1997, DLRIo OFICIAL
DA UNIAO [D.O.U] de 08.01.1997. (Braz.) (covering the extraction of water from
aquifers for final consumption and for the use of hydroelectric power). Brazil's
National Water Resource Policy also declares that, in times of scarcity, the use of
water is to be prioritized for human and animal consumption, further emphasizing
the human aspect of water as opposed to the economic (or agricultural) aspect of
water use. Id. art. 1.
43. See STEPHEN HODGSON, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UN, MODERN
WATER RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 4-5 (2006) (discussing the tremendous

variety in global conceptions of water and water rights).
44. See id. at 5 (describing potential benefits to a water right holder, including
the ability to divert water flow, extract gravel, fish, pollute, or use sewage water
for purposes related to irrigation).
45. See id. at 6 (noting that rights holders can seek judicial enforcement of their
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Many states have already organized regional cooperation
agreements for utilization of aquifers without the benefit of
guidelines for such cooperation.4 6 These agreements are sometimes
born out of a state's interest in its oil revenue base, which can lead to
the development of new groundwater resources.4 7 Unfortunately, the
population growth of less-developed states exacerbates the dire need
for water in areas least equipped with the technology capability to
access it.48 These disparities in the ability of states to access
groundwater may lead to uneven utilization and, ultimately, to unfair
dependence on shared groundwater by some aquifer states to the
detriment of their neighbors.4 9
C. DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE
GOVERNING TRANSBOUNDARY NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
CURRENT FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL EXTRACTION AND
UTILIZATION OF PETROLEUM AND NATURAL GAS

In 2002, the ILC incorporated into its work programme the topic

rights and receive compensation in cases of violation).
46. See, e.g., Raya M. Stephan, TransboundaryAquifers in InternationalLaw:
Towards an Evolution, in OVEREXPLOITATION AND CONTAMINATION OF SHARED
GROUNDWATER

RESOURCES:

MANAGEMENT,

(BIO)TECHNOLOGICAL,

AND

POLITICAL APPROACHES TO AvoID CONFLICTS 33, 37 (Christophe J.G. Darnault

ed., 2008) (discussing Egypt and Libya's Joint Authority for the Management of
the Nubian Aquifer, founded in 1992 and later expanded to include Sudan and
Chad).
47. See Nubian Aquifer Project - Background: More People, More
Development,

INT'L

ATOMIC

ENERGY

AGENCY,

http://www-

naweb.iaea.org/napc/ih/IHSprojectsnubianefforts.html (last visited May 18,
2011) (linking domestic oil exploration revenues in Libya to the government's
funding of water investigations, which led to the discovery of the Hamada, Kufra
and Murzuq freshwater reservoirs in the Sahara Desert).
48. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME [UNEP], SUDAN:
POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 301 (2007) (attributing both

financial limitations and lack of technical information to the prevalence of water
crises in Sudan).
49. Cf KHALED M. ABUZEID & MOHAMED H. ELRAWADY, CENTER FOR ENV'T
& DEV. FOR THE ARAB REGION & EUROPE, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF NONRENEWABLE

GROUNDWATER

3,

5

(2007),

available

at

http://water.cedare.int/filesl5%5CFile2837-.pdf (expressing concern that Egypt
and Libya's increased dependence on the Nubian Aquifer, evidenced by the
increasing amounts extracted over the years, could substantially impact Sudan and
potentially lead to further conflict in the region since Sudan also relies on the
aquifer).
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of shared natural resources, which included groundwater, oil, natural
gas, and other transboundary resources. 0 The Aquifer Law and its
nineteen articles constituted one part of the ILC's analysis of this
topic." While the U.N. member states considered the draft Aquifer
Law, the Special Rapporteur on Shared Natural Resources submitted
a report on transboundary oil and gas by request of the ILC Working
Group on Shared Natural Resources.52 The report commented on the
similarities and differences between oil and gas deposits and
groundwater, recommending that the ILC move forward separately
with the Aquifer Law to avoid further delay in developing the law."
After plenary debate and considerations by a working group, the
ILC submitted a questionnaire to U.N. member states and the Special
Rapporteur issued a report based on the preliminary results.54 Some
states responded in favor of further study on codifying transboundary
oil agreements. Other states opposed this, preferring to maintain the
case-by-case flexibility of current state practice.5 6 This preference
50. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 274 (citing the appointment of Chusei
Yamada as Special Rapporteur and noting his preference to begin by addressing
groundwater as he continued the ILC's work on the Watercourse Convention).
51. See Special Rapporteur on Shared Natural Resources, Fourth Rep. on
1, 3, U.N. Doc.
Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary Groundwaters,
A/CN.4/580 (Mar. 6, 2007) (by Chusei Yamada) [hereinafter Yamada Report]
(recounting the work of the ILC in developing the draft articles of the Aquifer Law
within the context of the broader issue of transboundary natural resources).
52. See id T 3 (noting the interconnection between groundwater and oil and
natural gas).
13-15 (calling for the Special Rapporteur to treat oil and
53. See id
groundwater individually, due to the fact that, unlike oil, groundwater is not
normally traded internationally, that oil extraction often takes place at sea while
groundwater extraction is on land, and most importantly that groundwater is
essential for life while oil and gas are commodities).
54. See Special Rapporteur on Shared Natural Resources, Paper on Oil and
Gas, 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/608 (Feb. 18, 2009) (by Chusei Yamada) (identifying
key issues on the subject including the common practice of forming bilateral
agreements between states as well as between national oil and gas companies,
which provide for, inter alia, cooperation, information exchange, equitable
sharing, and environmental protection).
55. See id. 5, 7 (noting that eighteen states responded to the questionnaire,
with one supporting simultaneous work on oil and water while others supported
their separate consideration).
56. See id. 1 7 (relating the desire of some states that the ILC not consider the
oil and gas topic, believing that the issue is "bilateral, highly technical and
politically sensitive"); see also Rolf Einar Fife, Dir. Gen., Nor. Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Transboundary Oil and Gas Reserves (Oct. 27, 2008), available at

1420

AM. U. INT'L L. REv.

[ 26:5

could be explained by the longstanding practice of utilizing bilateral
cooperation agreements for the exploitation of oil, which is
sometimes regarded as customary international law."
Although there are many well-established international norms
concerning state cooperation for oil extraction, no international
obligation exists to compel states into a particular kind of
agreement." Indeed, state practice varies in order to accommodate
the different needs of transboundary oil states. 9 Two common
measures used to exploit transboundary oil and gas reservoirs are
joint development agreements6 0 and transboundary unitization. 6 '
Additionally, the provisions of the agreements are constantly
evolving to improve the efficiency of extraction and the satisfaction
of the states involved.62 These changes reflect lessons learned from
http://www.norway-un.org/Statements/2008/CommitteMeetings/291008_oilandgas/ (representing the view of the five Nordic states that
the ILC should not codify international practice regarding transboundary oil and
gas).
57. See, e.g., Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers,
73 AM. J. INT'L L. 215, 243 (1979) (concluding that the nearly uniform practice of
cooperation enumerated in international agreements obligates parties to bilaterally
"negotiate in good faith" upon the discovery of a future common oil deposit).
58. See Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of Engagement: Developing CrossBorderPetroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean, 55 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 559, 564 (2006) (highlighting the absence of duty to form a specific type of
agreement under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which only "imposes a
general obligation to cooperate when a[n oil] deposit is found to cross boundary
lines" ).
59. See David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas
Deposits: "Mere" State Practice or Customary InternationalLaw?, 93 AM. J.
INT'L L. 771, 788-92 (1999) (listing three basic models of transboundary oil
utilization: 1) "one state manages the development of the deposits on behalf of
both states"; 2) a system of joint ventures is established between states and their oil
companies; or 3) an agreement between states to set up an international joint
authority with legal personality is made, providing a mandate to oversee the
development of the resource); see also Cameron, supra note 58, at 559.
60. See Lagoni, supra note 57, at 222-24 (explaining that joint development
agreements involve first reaching a preliminary agreement to divide the resource
between the parties, and then readjusting the division after gathering information
about the actual resource deposits).
61. See id. at 224 (defining unitization as designating one entity to oversee use
of a transboundary oil deposit); see also Ong, supra note 59, at 778 (stating that
joint development and transboundary unitization demonstrate the willingness of
state parties to cooperate regarding use of transboundary oil and gas deposits while
maintaining the sovereign right of each state to use the resources).
62. See Cameron, supra note 58, at 570-77 (summarizing the evolution of the
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decades of state experience with bilateral agreements concerning
transboundary oil.63
Most importantly, the bilateral and multilateral agreements
governing transboundary oil and gas extraction have many
provisions relevant to groundwater law.64 In addition, the desire
expressed by many oil states for the ILC to refrain from imposing
any binding guidelines on the practice might suggest a parallel
motivation underlying those states' reticence to ratify the
Watercourse Convention. 65 The ability of these states to negotiate
their own agreements in the total absence of international guidelines
may also provide a useful model for the Aquifer Law.66
III.ANALYSIS
Although the General Assembly resolution on the Aquifer Law
does not mandate its adaptation into a Convention, there are
important reasons for doing so.67 For instance, the ILC's Aquifer
Framework Agreement reached by North Sea States, beginning with the maritime
delimitation agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway in 1965 and
continuing through the 2005 Agreement, which allowed States involved enough
flexibility in regulating use of transboundary petroleum to maximize economic
benefit).
63. See id. at 571 (noting the considerable influence of several decades of
cross-border cooperation and unitization on both the United Kingdom and Norway
in drafting their 2005 agreement).
64. See, e.g., Framework Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the
Kingdom of Norway concerning Cross-Boundary Petroleum Co-operation, U.K.Nor., art. 1.10, Apr. 4, 2005 [hereinafter U.K.-Nor. Cross-Boundary Petroleum
Agreement], available at http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm67/
6792/6792.pdf (ensuring the exchange of information relating to the crossboundary project and recognizing that the interconnection of the U.K.-Norwegian
offshore pipeline and production will affect upstream and downstream systems).
65. See discussion infra Part I1.B (discussing the failure to ratify the
Watercourse Convention and the underlying reasons some state parties chose not
to ratify it).
66. Cf Yamada Report, supra note 51, if 13-15 (making it apparent that the
ILC intends to separate its work on groundwater from its work on oil and gas, thus
preventing consideration of the implications of oil practices on groundwater).
67. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, % 5-6 (encouraging states to consider the
provisions of the draft articles in their agreements and including deliberation of
their eventual form onto the General Assembly agenda); see also Eckstein &
Eckstein, supra note 16, at 201-05 (emphasizing the importance of groundwater as
a source of drinking water).
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Law fills a void left by the Watercourse Convention, which did not
cover groundwater resources unconnected to surface water. 6 8 Some
suggest that the Watercourse Convention also represents a regression
in the law, limiting the protections afforded by broader provisions of
the Seoul Rules. 69 Despite its shortcomings, the Aquifer Law is
necessary to fill in gaps and potentially provide a new and improved
framework from the previous rules and Watercourse Convention.70
However, the lack of precision of terms between the Aquifer Law
and Watercourse Convention limits the utility of the Aquifer Law.'
Furthermore, the reuse of the same controversial language in the
Watercourse Convention makes it unlikely that any eventual
Convention based upon the Aquifer Law would be adopted.72
68. See Gabriel E. Eckstein, Commentary on the U.N. International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on the Law of TransboundaryAquifers, 18 COLO. J.
INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 537, 551 (2007) (arguing that the imprecise definition of
"groundwater" led to the use of "aquifer" as the preferred term by which to analyze
such rights). Compare Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, art. 2 (defining
"watercourse" as "a system of surface waters and groundwaters constituting by
virtue of their physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a
common terminus"), with SEOUL RULES, supra note 32, art. 1 ("The waters of an
aquifer . . . intersected by the boundary between two or more States are
international groundwaters if such an aquifer . . . forms an international basin ...

whether or not the aquifer and its waters form surface waters part of a hydraulic
system flowing into a common terminus.").
69. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 283 ("Rather than focusing on the geologic
formation, the [Aquifer Law] could usefully have followed the approach of the ...
Seoul Rules on International Groundwaters, which regulate 'the waters of
international aquifers."').
70. Contra Margaret J. Vick, International Water Law and Sovereignty: A
Discussion of the ILC Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers, 21
PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 191-94 (2008) (questioning whether a
new convention is necessary to manage transboundary freshwater resources and
concluding that adding a protocol to the Watercourse Convention, rather than
creating new international regimes, would be best); cf Coalter G. Lathrop, Finding
the Right Fit: One Design Element in the International Groundwater Resource
Regime, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 413, 415 (2009) (indicating that
"groundwater is being misconceived as a common resource subject to a regime
with global scope" which could make the regime ineffective).
71. See Eckstein, supra note 68, at 555 (concluding, based on the confusing
overlap of terms, that if the Aquifer Law were to become binding it would have to
be harmonized with the Watercourse Convention, or some means of determining
which instrument governs a particular situation would need to be developed).
72. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 281-82 (observing that most of the
substantive articles of the Aquifer Law apply the principles of the Watercourse
Convention except those refinements regarding special characteristics of
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The United Nations remains undecided on how to approach the
Aquifer Law, whether to turn it into a binding Convention or leave it
in its current form as guidelines.7 3 Admittedly, international customs
are an important source of law for states, and non-binding
instruments can eventually become binding as customary law.74
Nonetheless, the obligation to protect the human right to life, which
necessitates access to water, creates an urgent need for a binding law
to protect this vital resource." In addition, the technical limitations of
developing states, which limit their access to subterranean
freshwater, underscore the usefulness of the Aquifer Law in
providing legal obligations to cooperate.7 6
A. THE AQUIFER LAW IS NECESSARY IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER AND FACILITATE TECHNOLOGICAL
COOPERATION IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE DISPARITY IN STATES'
CAPACITIES TO REACH GROUNDWATER RESOURCES.

The impact of aquifer utilization on human health, well-being and
security is significant.7 External factors, such as climate change and
weather patterns, increasingly affect the availability of fresh water
and amplify the importance of aquifers." The acute reliance on
groundwater).
73. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, TT 4, 6.
74. See, e.g., Alan E. Boyle, Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties
and Soft Law, 48 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 901, 902-03 (1999) (reasoning why soft law
instruments may be viewed as an appealing alternative to treaties, which includes
greater ease in forming agreements and avoiding the need for approval by domestic
ratification procedures, thereby allowing states to adhere to the law's provisions
more readily).
75.

See DESHENG Hu, WATER RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE

STUDY 102 (2006) (quoting Secretary-General Kofi Annan's statement that the
"'[a]ccess to safe water is a fundamental human need and, therefore, a basic human
right."').
76. Cf TEARFUND, DARFUR: RELIEF IN A VULNERABLE ENVIRONMENT 33

(2007) (recommending that UNEP engage in capacity-building and sustainable
management projects with Darfur to ensure "water and energy security" and
ameliorate the conflict).
77. See Menachem Elimelech, Special Paper, The Global Challenge for
Adequate and Safe Water, 55 J. WATER SUPPLY: RESEARCH & TECH. 3, 5 (2006)

(discussing the link between water scarcity and conflict between Israel and its
neighbors, particularly Palestine and Syria, due in part to competing interests in the
Sea of Galilee, the Coastal Aquifer, and the Mountain Aquifer, which are the three
major sources of Israel's water supply).
78. Cf UNEP, supra note 48, at 111 (expressing concern that the increased
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aquifers to meet basic drinking needs makes them potential targets
for attack. 7 9 In addition, some of the world's most volatile regions
already rely on aquifers as a major source of freshwater."o Many of
these states rely on international custom to guide their interactions
with one another when utilizing their shared groundwater." If water,
and the basic human need for it, is not protected, many predict that
international conflicts will soon follow. 82
dependence on groundwater at refugee camps may be unsustainable); see also
TEARFUND, DARFUR: WATER SUPPLY IN A VULNERABLE ENVIRONMENT: PHASE

Two OF TEARFUND'S DARFUR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDY 11 (2007) (stating that
average annual rainfall in Darfur decreased around 30% from the 1960s to the mid1980s and has not yet recovered, and predicting that climate change will lead to
less rain in the future); Rowena Mason, Copenhagen Climate Summit: Nearly Half
the World Will Suffer From Water Shortages 'Within 30 Years', TELEGRAPH, Dec.
2009,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/copenhagen-climate-change7,
confe/6745203/Copenhagen-climate-summit-Nearly-half-the-world-will-sufferfrom-water-shortages-within-30-years.html (reporting on the conclusion of leading
world scientists that climate change will cause water shortages, impacting farming,
agriculture, and industry).
79. See Nicholas D. Kristof, Dare We Call it Genocide?, N.Y. TIMES, June 16,
2004, at A21 (describing the practices of the Sudanese Janjaweed poisoning wells
with human and donkey corpses and limiting access to water by blowing up a dam
that supplied water to farms during the crisis in Darfur).
80. See Elizabeth Burleson, Middle Eastern and North African Hydropolitics:
From Eddies of Indecision to Emerging InternationalLaw, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 385, 396 (2006) (describing the dependence of Israeli and Palestinian
populations on the same aquifer); see generally AMNESTY INT'L, TROUBLED
WATERS - PALESTINIANS DENIED FAIR ACCESS TO WATER (2009), available at
/asset/MDE15/027/2009/en/e9892ce4-7fbahttp://www.amnesty.org/en/library
469b-96b9-clel084c620c/mdel50272009en.pdf (accusing Israelis of using a
disproportionate amount of the water from an aquifer shared with the Palestinians
which effectively denies Palestinians access to water).
81. See Ian J. Silverbrand, Israeli-PalestinianWater Literature's Misplaced
Dependence Upon Customary International Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 603, 621-625
(2007) (arguing that customary international law, such as the Helsinki Rules and
non-binding Watercourse Convention, do not apply to the Israeli-Palestinian water
problem).
82. See Jeffrey Sachs, Stemming the Water Wars, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 26,
2009), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/apr/26/water-shortage (reporting on the link
between water shortages and international conflicts in arid lands, noting that
"future water stresses will be widespread, [spanning] both rich and poor
countries"); see also Yamada Report, supra note 51, 14 (arguing that, in contrast
with oil as a source of energy, there is no alternative resource which humans can
use to meet their basic water needs); Neil MacFarquhar, Refugees Join List of
Climate-Change Issues, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2009, at A4 (claiming that some
experts believe battling in Darfur between nomads and villagers over shrinking
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A general duty to cooperate is prevalent throughout international
law on transboundary resources, and is particularly helpful in
situations where states differ in their technical capacity to locate and
utilize the resource." The Aquifer Law's provisions on technical
cooperation can help facilitate the sharing of data and information,
which disproportionally exist in the developed world.84 Article 16 of
the Aquifer Law requires states to promote "scientific, educational,
technical, legal, and other cooperation ... for the protection and
management of transboundary aquifers."" Even between developing
states, differences in financial and technological limitations impact
their ability for groundwater development. 6
The potential benefit of an obligation to share technology is
profound." One cooperative agreement, the Nubian Aquifer
Regional Information System, provides its riparian states with access
to cross-border groundwater information that they lacked." Ideally,
the Aquifer Law can provide guidelines and encourage more states to
natural resources is the first significant conflict attributable to climate change).
83. See, e.g., Ong, supra note 59, at 781-82 (describing the influence of the
duty to cooperate found in the Law of the Sea Convention on state practice
regarding common petroleum deposits).
84. See Eckstein, supra note 68, at 598-99 (stating that developed nations
primarily possess the technical and logistical capacity to conduct appropriate
hydrogeological studies and extraction).
85. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 16.
86. See UNEP, supra note 48, at 244 (providing the example of the Nubian
Aquifer, which "remains largely untapped in both Sudan and Chad" while Libya
and Egypt actively pump water for agricultural schemes via the Great Man-Made
River and the South Valley Development).
87. See generally International Workshop on Managing Shared Aquifers
Resources in Africa: 2nd to 4th June 2002, Tripoli - Workshop Report and
Recommendations,
UNESCO,
http://webworld.unesco.org/water/ihp/tripoli
report.shtml (last visited May 18, 2011); cf McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 282

(stating that improved technical understanding on the part of the ILC gives the
Aquifer Law a scientifically sound basis).
88. See KHALED M. ABU-ZEID, CTR. FOR ENV'T & DEV. FOR THE ARAB REGION
& EUR., REGIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THE NUBIAN SANDSTONE AQUIFER:
"POTENTIAL ARAB REGION & LATIN
AQUIFERS" 2, 6 (2007) (describing the

AMERICA

COOPERATION ON

LARGE

Nubian Aquifer Regional Information
System as a regional information system that from 1997 to 2002 was designed to
sustainably manage the Nubian Aquifer by providing member states with regional
thematic maps and mathematical models. This support was made possible by the
International Fund for Agricultural Development and an inter-regional
organization, the Centre for Environment and Development for the Arab Region
and Europe.).
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form similar regional agreements.89
B. THE AQUIFER LAW CONSTRAINS STATE ACTION AND FAILS TO
CLARIFY ITS SCOPE COMPARED TO THE WATERCOURSE
CONVENTION, MAKING ADOPTION OF AN EVENTUAL CONVENTION
UNLIKELY
The Aquifer Law's provisions are largely based, and in many
cases are virtually identical, to the articles of the Watercourse
Convention. 0 Despite the potential misconceptions of state parties,
the obligations imposed by the Watercourse Convention have been
blamed for the failure to enact it.91 The similarity between the most
objectionable provisions of the Watercourse Convention and Aquifer
Law suggests that, absent some changes to the language and binding
nature of the obligations, any Convention based on the Aquifer Law
would suffer a similar fate.92
Some view the Watercourse Convention-and thus by extension
the Aquifer Law-as a codification of customary international law
regarding utilization of freshwater resources.93 Complex and
controversial conventions, such as the Convention on the Law of the

89. Cf Salman, supra note 7, at 12 (noting the influence of the Watercourse
Convention on the South African Development Community's revision of their
Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems to make it consistent with the
Convention).
90. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 281-82; see also Eckstein, supra note 68,
at 544-50 (assessing an earlier draft of the Aquifer Law and noting that it follows
and builds on the Watercourse Convention).
91. See Alistair S. Rieu-Clarke et al., The Role and Relevance of the UN
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses to the EU and Its Member States, 2008 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 389, 2631, available at http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/WWF/RA
European _Union.pdf (comparing attitudes of European states that have ratified the
agreement with other European states that have expressed opposition, such as
Spain).
92. Cf Eckstein, supra note 68, at 555 (recommending that the Aquifer Law be
amended if it is ultimately adopted into a Convention because of the confusion that
would arise by the dual application of it and the Watercourse Convention).
93. ARIEL DINAR ET AL., BRIDGES OVER WATER: UNDERSTANDING
TRANSBOUNDARY WATER CONFLICT, NEGOTIATION AND COOPERATION 62-66

(2007) (recounting the historical development of international law governing

shared freshwater resources and noting that the Watercourse Convention is widely
regarded as reflecting rules of customary international law).
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Sea, can take a long time to enter into force.9 4 However, the failure to
ratify the Watercourse Convention raises significant doubts that any
future Convention based upon the Aquifer Law would be approved.95
The actual motivation of the states refusing to ratify the Watercourse
Convention is ambiguous.9 6 Nevertheless, the rhetoric surrounding
the Watercourse Convention establishes objective reasons for the
states' refusal to ratify it.97
Although the ILC clearly adopted lessons from the Watercourse
Convention in the Aquifer Law, the two instruments are not
explicitly linked beyond their similar subject matter." Given the
similar legal scope of the Watercourse Convention and Aquifer Law,
it is important to clearly define which obligations apply to what body
of groundwater.99 Many water law experts have observed that the
breadth of definitions in the Aquifer Law, while technically correct,
may cause significant confusion over which law covers which body
of groundwater. 00 This is because, while the Aquifer Law purports to
cover water contained in all transboundary aquifers, the Watercourse
Convention covers some of the same groundwater.10
Although the intent of the ILC was to address groundwater

94. Salman, supra note 7, at 12 (2007).
95. Cf id. (noting that states are under a misconception about losing
sovereignty over shared waters which makes it unlikely that the Convention will be
ratified).
96. Cf Rieu-Clarke et al., supra note 91, at 30 (arguing that the recent adoption
of the 1992 UNECE Helsinki Convention and the 2000 EU Water Framework
Directive by states opposing ratification may suggest that valid reasons no longer
exist for those states to oppose the U.N. Convention).
97. See Salman, supra note 7, at 8-12 (giving six major reasons for states'
hesitance to sign or ratify the Watercourse Convention, but explaining how each
reason is misguided).
98. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 2 (failing to reference either the
Watercourse Convention or define "groundwater," opting instead to introduce the
term "aquifer" which does not appear in the Watercourse Convention).
99. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 292 (claiming that the Aquifer Law
regulates not only shared freshwater that the Watercourse Convention does not
cover, but also groundwater resources that it does).
100. See id; see also Eckstein, supra note 68, at 555 (explaining that the term
"international aquifers" does not encompass all transboundary aquifers which
makes the definition of "aquifer" in the Aquifer Law critical).
101. Compare Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 2 (employing broad definitions of
both aquifers and aquifer systems with technically accurate but expansive
terminology), with Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
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resources, the phrase "groundwater" does not appear in the use of
terms in Article 2 or anywhere else in the Aquifer Law. 102 Article 2
of the Aquifer Law describes the use of terms but does not mention
either groundwater or watercourse. 0 3 The Watercourse Convention,
on the other hand, defines watercourses and uses the term
groundwater, not aquifer, in its definitions.104 Geologically, some
aquifers do flow and many are connected to surface waters. 0
However, a number of aquifers unconnected to surface water do not
remain static and in one location.10 6
Another critical area of contention is the relationship between the
principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation
not to cause harm.107 Article 6 of the Aquifer Law establishes the
obligation of states not to cause significant harm.' Articles 4 and 5
require equitable and reasonable utilization and enumerate factors
relevant to such utilization.'"0 Currently, many upstream and
downstream riparian states object to similar obligations imposed by
the Watercourse Convention, claiming that the Watercourse
Convention favors either upstream or downstream interests."0
102. Eckstein, supra note 68, at 551.
103. Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 2.
104. Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, art. 2.
105. See Eckstein & Eckstein, supra note 16, at 209-12 (providing a technical
description of aquifers, differentiating between confined and unconfined aquifers
and describing aquifer recharge, permeability, and flow).
106. Id.
107. See Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, arts. 5, 7 (requiring states to
use, develop, and protect an international watercourse in an equitable manner
"attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof," while also imposing the
requirement that states take all appropriate measures to prevent causing significant
harm to other watercourse states).
108. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 6 (mandating that states undertaking
activities impacting a transboundary aquifer, up to and including utilization, take
all appropriate measures to prevent significant harm or eliminate and mitigate such
harm as it occurs).
109. See id arts. 4-5 (requiring utilization in a manner consistent with equitable
and reasonable accrual of benefits, taking into consideration "population dependent
on an aquifer," characteristics and potential utilization of the aquifer, and the role
of the aquifer in the related ecosystems, among other factors).
110. But see Salman, supra note 7, at 9 (refuting this objection based on data
showing that a number of the countries that ratified the Watercourse Convention,
including Iraq, the Netherlands, Portugal and South Africa, are lower riparian
states and would therefore have ratified the treaty against their interests if the
Convention contained any built-in bias).
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Although a compromise was achieved in order to secure passage of
the Watercourse Convention by the General Assembly, most of the
states that accepted that compromise chose not to ratify the
Convention."II
Many states also objected to the Watercourse Convention's
treatment of existing agreements.l 1 2 The Watercourse Convention
acknowledges prior agreements, but asks member states to consider
harmonizing them with the basic principles of the Convention.1 13
Some states considered this an incomplete acknowledgement of their
prior arrangements.1 14 Ironically, the article in the Watercourse
dealing with prior agreements which these states found so
objectionable actually permitted states to "apply and adjust the
provisions" of the Watercourse Convention, although no specific
guidance is provided for when the Convention and the "watercourse
agreements" come into conflict." The Aquifer Law, by comparison,
provides no additional insight whatsoever on how preexisting
agreements are affected by its obligations. 1 16
Due to similarities with the Watercourse Convention, the Aquifer
Law is likely to raise similar concerns over potential bias in favor of
downstream riparian states."' That concern relates to the duty of
notification in the Watercourse Convention, which is absent in the
Aquifer Law."' Instead, the ILC included an article in the Aquifer
111. See id at 4, 8-9 (contrasting the approval of the Watercourse Convention
by 103 U.N. member states against the scant sixteen which have ratified it to date).
112. See id. at 10- 11 (indicating that some riparian states view the provision that
watercourse states may consider harmonizing such agreements with the principles
of the Convention as imposing an obligation to actually do so).
113. See Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
114. See Salman, supra note 7, at 10-11 (relating the concern among some states
that the Watercourse Convention does not fully recognize prior agreements and the
opposite concern of others not party to those agreements who believe that the
Convention should rigidly subject those agreements to its requirements).
115. Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, art. 3.
116. See Salman, supra note 7 at 10; see also Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 9
(encouraging states to enter into agreements but not discussing how prior
agreements are handled under the Aquifer Law).
117. See Salman, supra note 7 at 9 (noting "the perception by upper riparians
that the notification process under the Convention favors downstream riparians and
provides them with a veto power over projects and programs of upstream
riparians").
118. See generally Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, arts. 11-19
(establishing detailed procedures for watercourse states to notify one another of
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Law encouraging bilateral or regional agreements between states to
manage aquifers.119 The broader duty to cooperate, established in
Article 7 of the Aquifer Law, appears much less controversial. 120
Finally, the concept of sovereignty is one area in which the
Aquifer Law and Watercourse Convention appear to differ
tremendously. 12 1 States expressed reluctance to join the Watercourse
Convention due to their "apprehension about loss of sovereignty over
shared waters."1 2 2 During the General Assembly's discussion of the
draft Watercourse Convention, a few states criticized its failure to
address the sovereignty of the watercourse states over the parts of the
international watercourses located in their territory. 2 3 The Aquifer
Law provides a definition of sovereignty, albeit one that creates
ambiguity over whether sovereignty over aquifers is absolute, thus
failing to address how the sovereignty of states sharing aquifers and
surface water will be reconciled. 124
The utility of the Aquifer Law in facilitating state cooperation and
establishing norms to protect freshwater resources is undeniable.
However, the similarity of a number of key provisions in the Aquifer
Law to the language of the Watercourse Convention suggests that the
Aquifer Law stands no better chance at ratification than the
Watercourse Convention. If the ILC and the U.N. General Assembly
wish to promulgate a useful international treaty, binding or
otherwise, it will be important to change the document in advance of

planned measures which may have a significant, adverse effect upon other
watercourse states).
119. Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 9.
120. Id. art. 7 (establishing an obligation of aquifer states to "cooperate on the
basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, sustainable development, mutual
benefit and good faith").
121. See generally McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 285-93 (assessing Article 3 of
the Aquifer Law and the concept of sovereignty of aquifer states).
122. Salman, supra note 7, at 12.
123. See id.
124. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 291-93 (concluding that the notion of
sovereignty over shared groundwater should have no place in any set of rules
governing the use, protection, and management of shared freshwater resources
because it may encourage states to claim absolute sovereignty, absolute discretion,
or create problems regarding shared surface water); cf Boyle, supra note 74, at
902-03 (arguing the relative advantages of soft law over treaties and asserting that
"soft law instruments appear to be just as useful a means of codifying international
law as treaties").
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the final consideration by the 66th General Assembly in 2011.

IV.RECOMMENDATIONS
Proposals for changes to the Aquifer Law are based on a wide
variety of criticisms.125 However, the General Assembly has not
chosen a specific course of action for the ultimate disposition of the
Aquifer Law.12 6 Some argue that overlap between the Watercourse
Convention and Aquifer Law demonstrates that the General
Assembly need not take any further action.'2 7 Others argue that the
Watercourse Convention already serves an important function and
will continue to do so whether or not it ever enters into force. 128
Given the human rights implications of access to groundwater, the
United Nations should modify the Aquifer Law and draft a
convention based on it.12 9
A. THE ILC SHOULD AMEND THE AQUIFER LAW TO CLEARLY
DISTINGUISH IT FROM THE WATERCOURSE CONVENTION AND TO
ESTABLISH AN EXPLICIT HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER

Given the differences in terminology and requirements between
the Aquifer Law and Watercourse Convention, states party to either
agreement might be unable to discern which provisions apply. 3 0 The
Aquifer Law would benefit from a reference to the Watercourse
125. See, e.g., McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 285-92 (undertaking an article-byarticle analysis of the Aquifer Law, focusing on the concept of state sovereignty
over aquifer resources, while also criticizing the lack of technical clarity and other
specific failings).
126. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, pmbl., 4 (directing states to consider the
draft articles without soliciting improvements for any particular purpose, such as
adopting them as a Convention).
127. See Vick, supra note 70, at 193 (recommending that the Watercourse
Convention be amended to cover all groundwater and that a new Convention is
unnecessary).
128. See Salman, supra note 7, at 12 (noting that the International Court of
Justice has cited the Watercourse Treaty in adjudicating a case over the Danube
River and that the Southern African Development Community member countries
used the Convention to revised its 1995 Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems).
129. Cf Boyle, supra note 74, at 903 (stating that soft law instruments are often
as effective as treaties in codifying international law but treaties are preferred in
areas of new law-making like expanding human rights law).
130. See Eckstein, supra note 68, at 555 (noting that harmonization of the two
agreements would be necessary if the Aquifer Law were adopted as a binding
international agreement).
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Convention. 131 Article 2 should define groundwater in order to
augment and clarify the scope compared to the term supplied by the

Watercourse Convention. 132
The Aquifer Law should also state whether it purports to clarify,
narrow, or supersede the definitions and obligations provided in the
Watercourse Convention.133 Article 1, which defines the scope of the
law, should also include a provision specifically referencing the
Watercourse Convention, acknowledging that some of the subject
matter is equivalent. Given the failure of the Watercourse
Convention to achieve ratification, it would be prudent to have the
definitions and obligations of the Aquifer Law supersede it.'34
In addition, while any Convention based upon the Aquifer Law
should compel as little state action as possible, there is a critical
reason for imposing some restrictions on state action: the need to
protect access to fresh water as a basic human right.13 5 The United
Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights'
General Comment 15 to the ICESCR currently provides an implicit
obligation to protect the human right to water.13 6 The right is
"implicit" because, although most view the right to water as inherent

131. Cf Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 1, Sept. 7, 1956, 18
U.S.T. 3201, 226 U.N.T.S. 3 (referring to the 1926 League of Nations Convention
abolishing slavery to clarify terms between the two documents).
132. See Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 2 (defining only aquifer and aquifer
system, both of which are highly technical and make no legal distinction from the
Watercourse Convention).
133. Cf Convention on the Rights of the Child, pmbl., art. 28, Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (protecting the same right to education as the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, but specifying that the broad
right to education be applied to children in a manner consistent with the child's
human dignity).
134. Cf Salman, supra note 7, at 13-14 (arguing that the inability to ratify the
Watercourse Convention stemmed from misconceptions about the Convention's
provisions).
135. See Yamada Report, supra note 51, 14 (noting that there is no alternative
resource which humans can use to meet their basic water needs).
136. See HU, supra note 75, at 104 (relating to the argument in General
Comment 15 to the ICESCR by explicitly linking the right to food protected by the
Covenant to a right to water); see generally E.S.C. Res. 2002/12. U.N. Doc
E/RES/2002/12 (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter General Comment 15] (defining, inter
alia, the legal bases of the right to water and inferring such a right from provisions
of treaties which do not purport to explicitly establish such a right).
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in the right to food recognized under the ICESCR, the actual
Covenant makes no mention of the word "water" at any point.137
Moreover, neither the Watercourse Convention nor the proposed
Aquifer Law makes any reference to human rights at all."' Thus, the
Aquifer Law should become the first binding international
instrument to overtly refer to a human right to water, which may also
increase its chances of adoption."' Furthermore, any affirmative
obligations or restrictions upon state party action in a convention
based on the Aquifer Law could be based on the need to protect this
human right.

B.

THE AQUIFER LAW SHOULD FOLLOW EXISTING PRACTICE FOR
TRANSBOUNDARY OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION TO AFFORD STATES
THE GREATEST FLEXIBILITY IN FORMING AGREEMENTS TO UTILIZE
SHARED GROUNDWATER RESOURCES

The current norms for transboundary oil exploitation can provide
insight into international groundwater law in the same manner that
the provisions of the Law of the Sea helped guide and refine the
development of state practices for exploiting transboundary oil. 40
Many states enter into agreements with private enterprises and other
states that have the technical capacity to reach and refine otherwise
inaccessible oil deposits.141 A similar practice could also help
overcome the disparity in capacity to access groundwater

137. See HODGSON, supra note 43, at 8 (elaborating upon the "right to water" as
an extension of the right to an adequate standard of living, developed in General
Comment 15 of the Covenant).
138. Both instruments do, however, make reference to "human needs" at various
points. See, e.g., Aquifer Law, supra note 4, arts. 5(2), 17(3); Watercourse
Convention, supra note 5, art. 10.
139. Cf Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 133 (exemplifying an
international convention rooted in a basic human right that achieved widespreadnearly global-acceptance).
140. See Cameron, supra note 58, at 560 (advancing that a rule in favor of
cooperation between states is emerging in customary international law, which may
lead to bilateral agreements mandating cooperation with regard to common
petroleum resources); Ong, supra note 59, at 782 (raising questions about the legal
force of the obligation to cooperate but noting that Article 123 of the Law of the
Sea Convention appears to call for cooperation).
141. See Ong, supra note 59, at 789 (describing the popular model of joint
development consisting of "compulsory joint ventures between the interested states
and their national or other nominated oil companies").
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resources.142 In fact, the Special Rapporteur acknowledged that the
work on transboundary groundwaters could impact future
codification of oil and natural gas.143 Indeed, state practices in
handling transboundary oil and gas may prove a more appropriate
model for establishing rights and duties pertaining to aquifers. 144
To that end, the ILC should craft an agreement providing states the
flexibility to self-order. The preference for flexibility in self-ordering
bilateral and multilateral agreements is already apparent in the state
response to the ILC's proposed codification of transboundary oil and
gas law. 145 The relative ease and functionality of state transboundary
oil and gas agreements is largely attributable to states' flexibility in
arriving at those agreements.1 46
Obligations can also be stated in such a broad fashion as to afford
states the same flexibility as though no obligation had been imposed.
For instance, in order to promote cooperation, Article 16 of the
Aquifer Law requires states to "promote scientific, educational,
technical, legal, and other cooperation" for the protection and
management of transboundary aquifers but leaves it up to the states
to determine how to meet that obligation. 147 Also, the Watercourse
142.

See GREG MUTTITT, PLATFORM, PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS: OIL

PRIVATISATION BY ANOTHER NAME? 5 (2005), available at http://www.platform

london.org/carbonweb/documents/PSAsprivatisation.pdf (listing three state
practice models for structuring an oil industry, including production sharing
agreements in which states contract with foreign companies to attract capital and
technical ability to extract oil resources); TEARFUND, supra note 76, at 61
(describing the technical, financial, and national security difficulties in building
hafirs and dams).
143. See McCaffrey, supra note 8, at 274 (recognizing the overwhelming
support of governments for the law on transboundary aquifers to be "treated
independently of any future work of the Commission on the issues related to oil
and natural gas").
144. See Ong, supra note 59, at 772, 778, 780, 798 (analyzing customary
practices in international petroleum law which bear strong resemblances to the
concepts the ILC is seeking to codify in the Aquifer Law, including sovereignty,
preservation of the resource, the obligation to cooperate, and the obligation of
mutual restraint).
145. See, e.g., Fife, supra note 56 (requesting that the ILC refrain from
codifying international practice regarding transboundary oil and gas due to the preexisting system of bilateral agreements).
146. Cf Ong, supra note 59, at 788-92 (describing three basic models of
transboundary oil utilization as among the many flexible types of agreements states
may create).
147. Aquifer Law, supra note 4, art. 16.
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Convention provides language in Article 3 that could be borrowed
and refined to allow states this flexibility. 148 By establishing broad
guidelines and encouraging states to enter into bilateral and
multilateral agreements, the JLC may avoid some of the criticisms
and complaints of bias and unfairness that doomed the Watercourse
Convention.
Ultimately, the failure to ratify the Watercourse Convention is
another strong indicator that states will not voluntarily accept
absolute obligations without a compelling interest to do so.149 The
willingness of states to conform to customary practices in forming
bilateral oil and gas agreements demonstrates the effectiveness of
this practice.' o The ability of such agreements to change and evolve
without the approval of the entire United Nations is also a superior
mechanism to accommodate changing technology and dynamics.
Thus, by giving states as much flexibility as possible without
infringing on human rights, the ILC would promulgate a law with
much improved chances of ratification based on current state practice
and preferences.

V. CONCLUSION
The International Law Commission's work on the Aquifer Law
represents an important step toward ensuring the protection and
utilization of groundwater, which makes up ninety-seven percent of
the Earth's freshwater resources excluding polar ice. However, the
failure to ratify the Watercourse Convention suggests that the current
Aquifer Law would meet a similar fate.
In order to achieve the eventual enactment of a Convention based
on the Aquifer Law, the ILC should amend the current language to
148. See Watercourse Convention, supra note 5, art. 3(3) ("Watercourse States
may enter into one or more agreements, hereinafter referred to as 'watercourse
agreements', which apply and adjust the provisions of the present Convention to
the characteristics and uses of a particular international watercourse or part
thereof."). It should be noted that Article 3 does not specify whether such
agreements can completely alter and supersede the Convention. The Aquifer Law
should be clear which parts states can change and which parts they cannot.
149. See generally Salman, supra note 7, at 8-12 (describing six misconceptions
states use as reasons for rejecting the Watercourse Convention).
150. See, e.g., U.K.-Nor. Cross-Boundary Petroleum Agreement, supra note 64
(presenting the modern iteration of a fifty year, constantly changing agreement
between the United Kingdom and Norway).

1436

AM. U. INT L. REV.

[26:5

allow states flexibility to self-organize through bilateral and
multilateral agreements as they currently do with transboundary oil
and gas reserves. Any affirmative obligations should be based on the
need to protect the human right to water, which ought to be explicitly
stated in the Aquifer Law. The 66th General Assembly, which
convenes in September 2011, should then either adopt a Convention
based upon the Aquifer Law or propose additional changes to the
ILC with the express purpose of promulgating a convention.

